Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42890770›Full record

ReviewPatterns (New York, N.Y.)2026

AI safety is a system property, not a sum of individual defenses.

Xiang Chen, Chenxi Lin, Longlong Zhu, Yiheng Xu, Jiajie Su, Chunming Wu

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Patterns (New York, N.Y.), 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Xiang ChenZhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
Chenxi LinZhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
Longlong ZhuZhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
Yiheng XuZhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
Jiajie SuZhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.
Chunming WuZhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Safety for large language models (LLMs) and artificial intelligence (AI) agents remains fragmented; defenses against jailbreaking coexist with unresolved hallucination, fairness, and autonomous-control problems. Existing frameworks address these risks, but few specify how failure in one dimension changes another within a deployment. We argue that distinct safety failures can interact and amplify each other. We identify four safety challenge classes, analyze their interactions, and ground the argument in real-world incidents involving compound failures. We then audit GPT-5 and Claude-Sonnet-4.6 on clinical vignettes from the Medical Question Answering benchmark based on the United States Medical Licensing Examination (MedQA-USMLE). A single jailbreak can affect multiple safety dimensions, although patterns vary by model and attack. We propose three design principles for integrated safety architectures and identify agent safety and mechanistic interpretability as urgent open frontiers.

Indexed as

agentic AIAI fairnessAI governancealgorithmic safetyhallucinationinterpretabilityjailbreakinglarge language models

Identifiers

PMID42890770
PMCPMC13674307

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.