The securitization of global slow-onset risks/threats: long COVID, a case study.

This paper investigates why Long Covid, despite affecting millions globally and posing a serious threat to public health and economic stability, remains largely absent from contemporary security agendas. It argues that the condition's chronic, diffuse nature presents a temporal mismatch with existing security frameworks designed for acute, visible crises. Drawing on the Copenhagen School's securitization theory and Olaf Corry's concept of "riskification," the paper shows how structural, normative, and political obstacles-namely the difficulty of constructing chronic disability as collective harm within dominant security imaginaries-prevent Long Covid from being framed as an existential threat. Comparing the response to Long Covid with that of climate change and acute Covid-19, it reveals how scientific uncertainty, fragmented governance, and limited public awareness undermine mobilization. U.S. reluctance to lead, domestic political fragmentation, and a cultural emphasis on individual responsibility further diminish the prospects for securitizing moves. Internationally, institutions like the UN and WHO exhibit similar inertia due to ambiguous mandates and competing priorities. The paper concludes that Long Covid exposes critical gaps in traditional security thinking, particularly in addressing slow-onset, mass-disabling threats. As similar slow-onset disabling conditions may emerge in future biological crises, prevailing security conceptions could leave societies insufficiently prepared. The paper therefore uses securitization theory diagnostically to argue that political conceptions of security should better account for chronic harm and disability.