Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42778919›Full record

ArticleInternational journal for equity in health2026

"More work means less pay": a qualitative understanding of physicians' patient selection decision-making under DRG reform in Nanjing, China.

Xiaoying Zhu, Daniel Ll Strachan, Shenglan Tang, Tiara Marthias, Ajay Mahal, Barbara McPake

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Article in International journal for equity in health, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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1 · What the graph read from it

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3 · Its place in the literature

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4 · The record

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Xiaoying ZhuSchool of Elderly Care Services and Management, Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210023, China. zhuxymh@gmail.com.ORCID 0000-0002-1800-2114
Daniel Ll StrachanNossal Institute for Global Health, Melbourne School of Public Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, 3053, Australia.
Shenglan TangGlobal Health Research Center, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, Jiangsu, 215316, China.
Tiara MarthiasNossal Institute for Global Health, Melbourne School of Public Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, 3053, Australia.
Ajay MahalNossal Institute for Global Health, Melbourne School of Public Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, 3053, Australia.
Barbara McPakeNossal Institute for Global Health, Melbourne School of Public Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, 3053, Australia.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundPatient selection, also known as 'cream-skimming', can lead to the systematic exclusion of high-cost, clinically complex patients from necessary care. It has been identified as an opportunistic response under Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) payment systems globally. As China advances the rollout of DRG reform alongside commitments to promoting healthcare equity, understanding the ecology of physicians' cream-skimming behaviour and how to mitigate it is imperative.

methodsWe purposively sampled 21 physicians from two hospitals with different incentive structures in 2024 and conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews on their experiences with and responses to DRG reform. Data were analysed using an inductive thematic approach followed by deductive framework analysis.

resultsWe found that, in this study setting, physicians often assessed whether the expected reimbursement would cover the anticipated treatment costs when making admission decisions, with patient selection emerging as an adaptive response to DRG payment incentives. Their decisions were shaped by interacting factors related to capability, opportunity, and motivation. Capability captured physicians' confidence in managing financially risky cases; opportunity encompassed the physical and social conditions that enabled them to balance financial risk with quality of care; and motivation concerned the value they placed on different outcomes. Physicians were more likely to admit financially risky patients when three dimensions aligned: they believed that these patients could be effectively managed under DRG payment, expected their decisions to produce meaningful and recognised outcomes, and valued those outcomes, including patient welfare and the fulfilment of professional obligations.

conclusionsThe findings suggest that physicians' responses to DRG payment are driven not only by formal payment rules but also by how financial risks are perceived and mediated within hospitals and the broader health system. Improving equitable access requires realigning performance metrics with clinical needs, strengthening referral and post-acute care pathways, and reducing reliance on individual risk-based decision-making through team-based support.

Indexed as

Decision MakingDiagnosis-Related GroupsPhysiciansChinaFemaleHumansMaleQualitative ResearchCream skimmingDiagnosis-related groupFinancial incentiveHealth insurancePhysician behaviour

Identifiers

PMID42778919
PMCPMC13602623

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