Public information sharing during public health emergencies: an adaptive-network evolutionary game.

Introduction: Public health emergencies can generate verified sharing, opportunistic dissemination, and strategic silence within the same communication environment, yet diffusion-centered approaches offer limited explanation of how these contrasting behaviors emerge together or change as communication relationships evolve. Methods: This study develops an adaptive-network evolutionary game in which individuals choose among verified/corrective sharing, opportunistic sharing, and silence. The model links information value, verification burden, attention incentives, targeted sanctions, and participation-related liability to local interaction and adaptive rewiring. Results: Valuable and low-burden credible information favors verified sharing, whereas strong attention incentives favor opportunistic dissemination. Targeted accountability can redirect behavior toward credible participation, while generalized liability weakens good-faith sharing and, when combined with broader withdrawal incentives, can contribute to information vacuums. Discussion: By separating information quality, information absence, and structural connectivity, the study shifts attention from diffusion volume to the joint evolution of behavior and communication relationships. The findings provide a mechanism-based basis for designing public-health communication policies that constrain harmful dissemination without discouraging credible participation.