Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42741075›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology2026

A national framework for managing dual-use research of concern: integrating biosecurity, public health, and research governance.

Ruihan Zhang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Ruihan ZhangSchool of Population Health, Faculty of Medicine and Health, UNSW Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Dual-use research of concern (DURC)-legitimate life-science research that could be misapplied to cause significant harm-has become an increasingly urgent policy challenge. Advances in synthetic biology, gene editing, and artificial intelligence have expanded both the pace and diffusion of high-risk biological work, while governance systems remain fragmented across national boundaries. Based on a structured narrative policy review updated through 28 July 2026, this article proposes a comprehensive national DURC risk-management program that bridges biosecurity, public health, research governance, and emergency management. Drawing on the World Health Organization's 2022 Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences, the ISO 35001:2019 biorisk management standard, and national policy precedents-including the design of the 2024 U.S. Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (DURC-PEPP Policy), whose planned implementation was superseded by Executive Order 14,292 while a revised or replacement federal policy remained under development at the final search date-the article maps five overlapping threat pathways relevant to DURC governance, analyzes their multi-layered consequences, and identifies existing tools and stakeholder interfaces that can be adapted. The core of the framework comprises eleven integrated recommendations across prevention and response domains: establishing a national DURC governance structure, strengthening institutional oversight and ethics review, implementing laboratory biorisk management systems, addressing cyberbiosecurity, mitigating insider threats, promoting responsible communication safeguards, enhancing early detection and surveillance, developing DURC-specific emergency response plans, protecting first responders and healthcare workers, institutionalizing risk communication and public engagement, and embedding continuous learning and international collaboration. The program emphasizes the protection of frontline workers, the integration of occupational health into biosecurity planning, and the institutionalization of intersectoral coordination mechanisms. Achieving these goals requires sustained collaboration across health, security, research, digital, and community sectors, but the benefits extend beyond DURC, enhancing national preparedness for all biological threats.

Indexed as

biorisk managementbiosafetybiosecuritycyberbiosecuritydual-use research of concernhealth securityresearch governance

Identifiers

PMID42741075
PMCPMC13572614

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.