Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42726711›Full record

ArticlePloS one2026

Can tiered open-source mandates optimize innovation? A differential game study osn platform vs. independent project dynamics in foundation software ecosystems.

Bingyang Wu, Yongxi Yi

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Bingyang WuSchool of Management Science, Dhonburi Rajabhat University, Dhonburi, Thailand.
Yongxi YiSchool of Technology and Business, Hunan University of Information Technology, Changsha, China.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2479-4488

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The governance of AI foundation software ecosystems requires balancing platform scale and independent innovation to ensure technological sovereignty. This paper examines whether tiered open-source mandates-with differentiated requirements for platforms and independents-can optimize ecosystem innovation. We develop and solve a tripartite Stackelberg differential game model incorporating differences in compliance costs, ecosystem dependence, and appropriation capabilities. Analysis shows that tiered mandates outperform uniform ones when heterogeneity exceeds threshold levels, optimally imposing stricter rules on platforms (θD∈[0.60,0.75]) and offering flexibility to independents (θI∈[0.25,0.40]). Ecosystem health improvements range from 15-40%, peaking under high compliance cost asymmetry (λD/λI>2.0). Key boundary conditions are identified, and an adaptive decision framework is proposed. This research formalizes differentiated mandates as an endogenous policy variable, quantifies dominance conditions, and provides actionable thresholds, demonstrating that calibrated differentiation based on structural heterogeneity can optimize innovation in AI infrastructure governance. Throughout this paper, "health improvement" refers specifically to the ecosystem architect's composite health function H(KD,KI), a governance metric of scale, diversity, and balance, not a full measure of social welfare.

Indexed as

EcosystemGame TheorySoftwareModels, Theoretical

Identifiers

PMID42726711
PMCPMC13567796

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.