Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42614370›Full record

ArticleEPJ quantum technology2026

Assessment of provably secure hybrid authenticated key exchange for dual-use applications.

Simon Abelard, Juan Antonio Vieira Giestinhas, Delaram Kahrobaei, Ludovic Perret, Timothy Spiller, Christoph Striecks

Abstract read
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in EPJ quantum technology, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Simon AbelardLRE, EPITA, 14 rue Voltaire, Le Kremlin Bicêtre, 94270 France.
Juan Antonio Vieira GiestinhasSchool of Physics, Engineering and Technology, University of York, Information Centre Market Square, York, YO10 5DD UK.
Delaram KahrobaeiSchool of Physics, Engineering and Technology, University of York, Information Centre Market Square, York, YO10 5DD UK.
Ludovic PerretLRE, EPITA, 14 rue Voltaire, Le Kremlin Bicêtre, 94270 France.
Timothy SpillerSchool of Physics, Engineering and Technology, University of York, Information Centre Market Square, York, YO10 5DD UK.
Christoph StriecksAIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Giefinggasse 4, Vienna, 1210 Austria.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This work assesses the literature on QKD-PQC Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange (HAKE) and related schemes, based on security proofs (e.g. availability of such a proof and underlying model), performance, and near-term implementation. We evaluate these protocols across diverse dual-use environments, ranging from strategic military SATCOM to high-value civilian infrastructure, such as banking backbones. The trade-offs among various solutions are discussed based on their Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and performance. Moreover, we identify specific use cases such as untrusted satellite nodes or long-distance terrestrial links which might require alternative measures depending on the operational requirements.

Indexed as

Dual-use applicationsHybrid Authenticated Key Exchange (HAKE)Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

Identifiers

PMID42614370
PMCPMC13481566

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.