ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2026
Illegal markets for cigarettes and e-cigarettes.
Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed.
- A budding science of illegal markets.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- The policy construction of illegal markets: Exploring variation, success, failure, and unintended consequences.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- Illegal markets: An important domain for applied science.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
Abstract
This paper discusses the long-standing illegal markets for cigarettes and the more recently emerged illegal markets for e-cigarettes. We identify three distinctive market fundamentals that help explain many features of the illegal markets. First, in contrast to some illegal goods, many countries have sizable legal markets for cigarettes and e-cigarettes alongside the illegal markets. In 2024, tobacco products generated almost $1 trillion in revenues; e-cigarettes generated $26 billion dollars. It is estimated that illegal markets account for about 10 percent of global cigarette consumption. Second, the illegal markets have arisen to evade high excise taxes that increase prices and regulations that restrict the availability of desirable features of legal products. The taxes and regulations have been adopted as public health measures with the goal of reducing tobacco consumption; however, these same policies drive the formation of illegal markets. Third, demand-side linkages mean that taxation, regulatory, and enforcement policies targeted at legal and illegal markets for cigarettes will affect legal and illegal markets for e-cigarettes, and vice versa. The connection between the markets means regulatory policy for one product can drive consumers both to the illegal market for the product and to the legal and illegal market for the other product.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.