Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42574625›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2026

Many-eyes and sentinels in selfish and cooperative groups.

Charlie Pilgrim, Andrew M Bate, Anna Sigalou, Mélisande Aellen, Joe Morford, Elizabeth Warren, Christopher Krupenye, Dora Biro, Richard P Mann

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Charlie PilgrimDepartment of Statistics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0002-3800-677X
Andrew M BateDepartment of Statistics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0002-2477-0451
Anna SigalouDairy Research Institute of Asturias, Spanish National Research Council (IPLA-CSIC), Oviedo 33011, Spain.ORCID 0000-0002-0813-3911
Mélisande AellenDepartment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.ORCID 0000-0002-8408-0268
Joe MorfordDepartment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.ORCID 0000-0003-3687-1783
Elizabeth WarrenDepartment of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.ORCID 0000-0003-1183-4521
Christopher KrupenyeDepartment of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.ORCID 0000-0003-2029-1872
Dora BiroDepartment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.ORCID 0000-0002-3408-6274
Richard P MannDepartment of Statistics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0003-0701-1274

Funding

Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF) TWCF-410 2021-2064
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Collective vigilance describes how animals in groups benefit from the predator detection efforts of others. Empirical observations typically find either a many-eyes strategy with all (or many) group members maintaining a low level of individual vigilance, or a sentinel strategy with one (or a few) individuals maintaining a high level of individual vigilance while others do not. With an analytical treatment that makes minimal assumptions, we show that these two strategies are alternative solutions to the same adaptive problem of balancing the costs of predation and vigilance. Which strategy is preferred depends on how costs scale with the level of individual vigilance: Many-eyes strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise gently at low levels but become steeper at higher levels (convex; e.g., an open field); sentinel strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise steeply at low levels and then flatten out (concave; e.g., environments with vantage points). This same dichotomy emerges whether individuals act selfishly to optimize their own fitness or cooperatively to optimize group fitness. The model is extended to explain discrete behavioral switching between strategies, differential levels of vigilance such as edge effects, and turn-taking.

Indexed as

Behavior, AnimalCooperative BehaviorModels, BiologicalAnimalsPredatory Behaviorbehavioral ecologycollective intelligencecollective vigilancecooperationevolution

Identifiers

PMID42574625
PMCPMC13486572

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.