Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42574610›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2026

The policy construction of illegal markets: Exploring variation, success, failure, and unintended consequences.

Letizia Paoli, Peter Reuter

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. A budding science of illegal markets.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  2. Illegal markets: An important domain for applied science.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Letizia PaoliDepartment of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law and Criminology, KU Leuven, Leuven 3000, Belgium.ORCID 0000-0002-3609-9239
Peter ReuterSchool of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.ORCID 0000-0002-7809-0849

Funding

Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (FWO) G075217NNSF (NSF) 21-582
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Illegal markets, broadly defined to include markets where only specific transactions are illegal, are the consequence of policy, either a prohibition or highly restrictive regulation. They are generated by a variety of concerns, some moral, some pragmatic. They are often tied to legal markets, complicating the policy process. These markets are ubiquitous, rarely well controlled and little studied as markets. This article examines variations in illegality from the case studies in this Special Feature and synthesizes what can be learned about the success and failure of different approaches to controlling these markets. Control is often weak because powerful legal interests are opposed to tight regulation and, especially in markets with large underlying demand, rarely leads to substantial reductions in the targeted activity, unless draconian methods are used. As demonstrated by drug markets, tough enforcement can have large adverse collateral consequences. The paper concludes by suggesting that an extension of the harm reduction framework developed specifically for drug policy can be applied usefully to making policy choices in controlling other illegal markets.

Indexed as

CommerceDrug and Narcotic ControlDrug TraffickingIllicit DrugsPublic PolicyHarm ReductionHumansUnited StatesIllicit Drugsdrug policyharm reductionillegal marketsprohibitionregulation

Identifiers

PMID42574610
PMCPMC13486593

What OpenQuestion holds

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Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.