ArticleAmerican economic journal. Economic policy2017
Technological Change and Risk Adjustment: Benefit Design Incentives in Medicare Part D.
Article in American economic journal. Economic policy, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 17 papers.
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Who cites it
17 citing papers in PubMed.
- Veterans Health Administration benefit value has little effect on reliance.The American journal of managed care · 2025Article
- Risk adjustment for regional healthcare funding allocations with ensemble methods: an empirical study and interpretation.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2024Article
- Adverse selection and network design under regulated plan prices: Evidence from Medicaid.Journal of health economics · 2024Article
- Scope and Incentives for Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets With Regulated Competition: A Conceptual Framework and International Comparison.Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2024Review
- The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets.The review of economics and statistics · 2023Article
- How to deal with persistently low/high spenders in health plan payment systems?Health economics · 2022Article
- Identifying undercompensated groups defined by multiple attributes in risk adjustment.BMJ health & care informatics · 2021Article
- Improving the Performance of Risk Adjustment Systems: Constrained Regressions, Reinsurance, and Variable Selection.American journal of health economics · 2021Article
- Fair regression for health care spending.Biometrics · 2020Article
- Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2020Article
- Upcoding: Evidence from Medicare on Squishy Risk Adjustment.The journal of political economy · 2020Article
- Data transformations to improve the performance of health plan payment methods.Journal of health economics · 2019Article
- Screening in Contract Design: Evidence from the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2019Article
- Deriving risk adjustment payment weights to maximize efficiency of health insurance markets.Journal of health economics · 2018Article
- Strategic Formulary Design in Medicare Part D Plans.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2018Article
- Technological Change and Risk Adjustment: Benefit Design Incentives in Medicare Part D.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2017Article
- Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies.The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic AssociationArticle
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
Abstract
Subsidized health insurance markets use diagnosis-based risk adjustment to induce insurers to offer an equitable benefit to individuals of varying expected cost. I demonstrate that technological change after risk adjustment calibration-new drug entry and the onset of generic competition-made certain diagnoses profitable or unprofitable in Medicare Part D. I then exploit variation in diagnoses' profitability driven by technological change to show insurers designed more favorable benefits for drugs that treat profitable diagnoses as compared to unprofitable diagnoses. In the presence of technological change, risk adjustment may not fully neutralize insurers' incentives to select through benefit designs.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.