ArticleFrontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology2026
The limits of sequence-based biosecurity screening tools in the age of AI-assisted protein design.
Article in Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Secret watermark labels proteins as 'made by AI'.Nature · 2026Article
- Beyond sequence similarity: toward function-based screening of nucleic acid synthesis.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Developing a standard definition for sequences of concern.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Compounding asymmetries in nucleic acid synthesis screening: policy pathways for strengthening global biosecurity governance.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
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Authors and funding
13 authors.
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Abstract
Rapid advancements in AI have enabled significant progress in protein and nucleic acid design, but they also pose biosecurity challenges. We examine the vulnerabilities of biosecurity screening software (BSS) to AI-reformulated synthetic homologs of proteins of concern (POCs) that have been fragmented into smaller segments. We evaluate four BSS tools that were recently patched to enhance their AI resiliency. Without any further modification, we found that two of the four tools were capable of robustly detecting fragments as short as 50 nucleotides, demonstrating screening capabilities that exceed those requested in the United States Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis. Upgraded versions of the other two tools improved performance. Although our findings confirm the effectiveness of the tested BSS tools, at the same time, they emphasize the urgency of developing alternate BSS approaches to counter evolving AI-enabled biosecurity risks.
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