Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42512519›Full record

ReviewBrain sciences2026

Consciousness in the Brain: An Integrative Review of Contemporary Theories.

Arosh S Perera Molligoda Arachchige, Afanasy Svet, Maria Svet

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Brain sciences, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Arosh S Perera Molligoda ArachchigeUniversity of Milan, Via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122 Milan, Italy.ORCID 0000-0002-3875-0267
Afanasy SvetUniversity of Geneva, 24 Rue du Général-Dufour, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland.
Maria SvetIndependent Researcher, 1231 Geneva, Switzerland.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Understanding consciousness remains one of the most significant challenges in neuroscience, philosophy, and cognitive science. Despite substantial advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiology, and computational modeling, a comprehensive account of the neural basis of conscious experience has yet to emerge. This review examines several leading contemporary theories of consciousness, including the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), Dendritic Integration Theory (DIT), Predictive Processing (PP), and the Memory Theory of Consciousness (MToC). The philosophical foundations, core theoretical claims, and empirical evidence supporting each framework are critically evaluated. Particular attention is given to how these theories address phenomenal consciousness-the subjective quality of experience-and access consciousness, i.e., the availability of information for cognitive control, report, and behavior. By comparing convergent and divergent predictions across theoretical perspectives, this review highlights key areas of agreement, ongoing debates, and unresolved questions in the field. The analysis suggests that consciousness is likely to involve multiple interacting neural mechanisms operating across different spatial and temporal scales, underscoring the need for continued interdisciplinary research to advance a more comprehensive understanding of conscious experience.

Indexed as

Dendritic Integration Theory (DIT)Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT)Integrated Information Theory (IIT)Memory Theory of Consciousness (MToC)Predictive Processing (PP)Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT)

Identifiers

PMID42512519
PMCPMC13406589

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.