ArticlePloS one2026
Governing digital misinformation: A computational analysis of platform intervention using a three-party evolutionary game model.
Article in PloS one, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
0 citing papers in PubMed.
No citing paper in PubMed yet.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The proliferation of misinformation on short video platforms poses a significant challenge to digital governance and public trust. While platforms are central actors, their strategic role in rumor governance remains underexplored. This study introduces a tripartite evolutionary game model that incorporates the platform as a bounded rational strategic actor alongside rumor spreaders and information clarifiers, and combines this model with the extended SICR (Susceptible-Rumor spreader-Clarifier-Recovered) information diffusion framework, where game strategies and payoffs are defined based on user roles. This combined framework allows us to analyze the strategic interactions among these three agents. Numerical simulations identify key evolutionary stable states and reveal that increasing the probability and perceived benefits of platform intervention can effectively steer the system towards an ideal equilibrium where platforms strictly supervise, and clarifiers actively debunk rumors. A case study of the "Hengshan Bus" incident supports the model's applicability, demonstrating that proactive platform intervention accelerates the dissemination of corrective information. Our findings illustrate the important and strategically complex role of platforms in self-regulation, and provide insights for co-governance mechanism design on Chinese short-video platforms.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.