ArticleFrontiers in public health2026
Behavioral decision-making and path optimization of stakeholders in straw collection, storage, and transportation within rural public health governance.
Article in Frontiers in public health, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
- Public information sharing during public health emergencies: an adaptive-network evolutionary game.Frontiers in public health · 2026Article
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Authors and funding
6 authors.
Funding
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Abstract
Introduction: Efficient utilization of straw resources addresses both resource scarcity and environmental degradation while promoting green development. Despite China's abundant straw resources, uneven spatial distribution and practical challenges in collection, storage, and transportation (CS&T) limit large-scale utilization and pose rural public health risks due to improper disposal. Methods: This study integrates government, straw-specialized cooperatives, and farmers into a unified analytical framework and applies evolutionary game theory to examine strategic choices and dynamic interactions among stakeholders in the CS&T process. Key factors analyzed include government regulation costs, subsidy rewards, straw collection and transportation costs, and sales revenues. Results: The results indicate that subsidy rewards and sales revenues are the most significant drivers of stakeholder participation. Moderately increasing subsidies and rewards, while appropriately reducing fines, lowers participation costs for cooperatives and farmers, promoting active involvement and reducing open-air burning. Reducing government regulation costs, improving subsidy allocation accuracy, and moderately increasing fines enhance supervision efficiency. Stakeholder strategies are interconnected in a dynamic feedback system, forming a collaborative cycle of "field collection, centralized storage, standardized transportation, and resource recycling," which improves CS&T efficiency. Discussion: Long-term policy effectiveness requires a scientifically designed incentive mechanism, with subsidies increased but capped at no more than twice the current standard, balancing motivation, fiscal sustainability, and policy feasibility. This study clarifies multi-stakeholder interaction mechanisms and offers theoretical and practical guidance for optimizing straw resource utilization and strengthening rural public health governance.
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