ReviewMedicine, health care, and philosophy2026
The moral significance of moral distress.
Review in Medicine, health care, and philosophy, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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2 authors.
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Abstract
Since Andrew Jameton introduced the term "moral distress" (MD) in 1984, the concept has attracted extensive attention in the healthcare literature. Much of this work emphasizes the costs of MD-for instance, psychological pain, work dissatisfaction, and burnout-while some highlights its potential benefits, including motivating self-improvement and institutional reform. We survey these assessments and argue that the bulk of them share a common limitation: they evaluate MD purely instrumentally, in terms of its painfulness and consequences, rather than its character as a moral experience. This instrumental framing, we contend, obscures MD's core moral significance and invites misguided interventions. In particular, it neglects the question of when MD is a fitting response to one's situation, and thus justified on intrinsic rather than instrumental grounds. We suggest that MD is fitting when one is genuinely constrained from meeting a moral requirement, and that fitting MD is significant in its own right.
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