Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42328605›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology2026

Developing a standard definition for sequences of concern.

Tessa Alexanian, Jacob Beal, Craig Bartling, Jens Berlips, Peter A Carr, Adam Clore, Helena Cozzarini, James Diggans, Yorgo El Moubayed, Kevin Esvelt and 14 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Implementing emerging customer screening standards for nucleic acid synthesis.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

24 authors.

Tessa AlexanianInternational Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), Geneva, Switzerland.
Jacob BealRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Craig BartlingBattelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, OH, United States.
Jens BerlipsSecureDNA, Basel, Switzerland.
Peter A CarrRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Adam CloreIntegrated DNA Technologies, Coralville, IA, United States.
Helena CozzariniSecureDNA, Basel, Switzerland.
James DiggansTwist Bioscience, South San Francisco, CA, United States.
Yorgo El MoubayedInternational Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), Geneva, Switzerland.
Kevin EsveltMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Kevin FlyangoltsAclid, New York, NY, United States.
Leonard FonerSecureDNA, Basel, Switzerland.
Patrick A FullertonBattelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, OH, United States.
Bryan T GemlerBattelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, OH, United States.
Caitlin A D JaglaRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Rassin LababidiInternational Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), Geneva, Switzerland.
Tom MitchellRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Steven T MurphyRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Michael T ParkerCollege of Arts and Sciences, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States.
Nicholas RoehnerRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Andre RuschThermo Fisher Scientific, Regensburg, Bayern, Germany.
Kemper TalleyRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Troy TimmermanRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Nicole E WheelerUniversity of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Readily available nucleic acid synthesis is both critical for the bioeconomy and an increasingly pressing security concern due to the potential for accidental or deliberate misuse. While biosecurity experts broadly agree that nucleic acid providers should screen orders for potential "sequences of concern," there has previously been no agreed standard for how to define and recognize such sequences. To address this gap, we first organized a collection of test sets containing 1.1 million sequences from pathogens and toxins on the Australia Group Common Control Lists and their non-controlled relatives, along with model organisms and synthetic constructs. An initial categorization of sequences as to whether or not they were sequences of concern was produced by comparing the results of four biosecurity screening systems for each of these sequences, finding that these systems already agreed on the categorization of more than 80% of sequences. We then refined these results through a science-based stakeholder review process to define a rubric for determining whether a sequence should be flagged as a potential sequence of concern, then applied this rubric to improve the categorization of sequences in test sets. The result is a rubric that identifies sequences of concern with respect to human pandemic-potential viruses, key classes of low-risk genes, and controlled toxins. Applying this rubric to the test set collection has, to date, reduced the number of test sequences with disputed categorization by 44.3% for controlled viruses and 10.7% across the collection of test sets as a whole. Together, the rubric and the test sets provide a concrete "sequence of concern" definition that can be used as a foundation for development of biosecurity screening standards and policy and is also continuing to be refined in ongoing work.

Indexed as

biosecurityDNA synthesisgene synthesisnucleic acidsscreeningsequences of concernstandards

Identifiers

PMID42328605
PMCPMC13275487

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.