Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42281029›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2026

An Integrated Testbed for MITRE-Mapped Attack Emulation in Industrial Control Networks.

Jaafer Rahmani, Kai Oliver Detken, Axel Sikora

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Jaafer RahmaniInstitute of Reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics (ivESK), Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany.ORCID 0009-0008-0975-2301
Kai Oliver DetkenDECOIT GmbH & Co. KG, 28359 Bremen, Germany.
Axel SikoraInstitute of Reliable Embedded Systems and Communication Electronics (ivESK), Offenburg University of Applied Sciences, 77652 Offenburg, Germany.ORCID 0000-0003-0878-2919

Funding

German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy KK5189606RG4
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Evaluating intrusion detection methods at the level of individual MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) for Industrial Control System techniques requires Operational Technology traffic in which each attack sequence carries its MITRE technique identifier as ground truth. Publicly available Industrial Control System datasets either provide coarse attack-versus-benign labels (SWaT, WADI, CIC-APT-IIoT) or require ex-post technique reconstruction from CALDERA operation logs, and therefore do not support per-technique benchmarking. We describe one primary contribution and two supporting contributions, demonstrated on one Modbus/Raspberry-Pi programmable logic controller/CALDERA/convolutional bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory autoencoder (CNN-BiLSTM-AE) use case. The

Indexed as

anomaly detectionautoencoderCALDERAIndustrial Control SystemsMITRE ATT&CKModbusmulti-stage attack emulationOperational TechnologyPROFINETtestbed

Identifiers

PMID42281029
PMCPMC13259467

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.