Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42220909›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology2026

Beyond sequence similarity: toward function-based screening of nucleic acid synthesis.

Gary R Abel, Tessa Alexanian, Craig Bartling, Jacob Beal, Samuel Curtis, Kevin Flyangolts, Leonard Foner, Samuel P Forry, Gene D Godbold, Eric Horvitz and 11 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

21 authors.

Gary R AbelFourth Eon Bio, San Diego, CA, United States.
Tessa AlexanianInternational Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science, Geneva, Switzerland.
Craig BartlingBattelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, OH, United States.
Jacob BealRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Samuel CurtisCenter for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), National Institute of Standards and Technology, Washington, DC, United States.
Kevin FlyangoltsAclid, New York, NY, United States.
Leonard FonerSecureDNA, Basel, Switzerland.
Samuel P ForryBiosystems and Biomaterials Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, United States.
Gene D GodboldSignature Science LLC, Charlottesville, VA, United States.
Eric HorvitzMicrosoft, Office of the Chief Scientific Officer, Redmond, WA, United States.
Bin HuBioscience Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, United States.
Corey M HudsonThe Align Foundation, Covina, CA, United States.
Caitlin JaglaRTX BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Rassin LababidiInternational Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science, Geneva, Switzerland.
Sheng Lin-GibsonBiosystems and Biomaterials Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, United States.
Brittany Rife MagalisDepartment of Biochemistry and Molecular Genetics, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, United States.
Jaspreet PannuJohns Hopkins University Center for Health Security, Baltimore, MD, United States.
Sebastian RiveraEngineering Biology Research Consortium, Emeryville, CA, United States.
David RossBiosystems and Biomaterials Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, United States.
Bruce J WittmannMicrosoft, Office of the Chief Scientific Officer, Redmond, WA, United States.
James DiggansTwist Bioscience, South San Francisco, CA, United States.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Synthetic nucleic acids are a key input to modern biotechnology, yet they represent dual-use materials that require robust screening to mitigate biosecurity risks. The prevailing screening paradigm, which identifies sequences of concern (SoCs) through sequence similarity to controlled pathogens and toxins, may not fully capture risks posed by AI tools that can decouple biomolecular function from reliance on known sequences. Rapidly advancing biodesign capabilities enable the generation of genes and proteins that might evade sequence-based detection. We highlight the critical need for function-based screening approaches that can detect sequences capable of hazardous biological functions, regardless of similarity to known SoCs. We examine the feasibility of function-based screening with an initial focus on proteins, arguing that, while protein sequence space is vast, biologically functional proteins are significantly constrained by biophysical and biochemical requirements that can be learned and modeled. We propose a concrete implementation framework organized along a continuum of complexity, starting with toxins as the most tractable targets before expanding to more complex pathogenic functions. We then discuss open challenges and describe a research and development strategy to address them.

Indexed as

biological foundation modelsbiosecurityDNA synthesis screeningfunction-based screeningprotein function prediction

Identifiers

PMID42220909
PMCPMC13216487

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.