Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42189989›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2026

Conscious and nonconscious thought: Insights from the neuroscience of decision-making.

Michael N Shadlen

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Michael N ShadlenDepartment of Neuroscience, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.ORCID 0000-0002-2002-2210

Funding

Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) N/A
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Conscious thought is often treated as a special class of neural processing, distinct from the nonconscious computations that guide most behavior. Here I offer a different perspective, grounded in the neuroscience of decision-making. I argue that conscious thought arises not from a unique mechanism but from a distinctive use of neural representations already engaged in nonconscious thought. Nonconscious thoughts are structured as interrogations that yield provisional intentions-decision-like commitments that guide action or inquiry without entering awareness. Using examples from perceptual decision-making and neurophysiology, I suggest that such thoughts depend on persistent neural representations that encode not only potential actions but the questions that give them meaning. These knowledge states may also preserve source-sensitive structure that supports a minimal experiential organization even when they remain nonconscious. Conscious thought, on this account, emerges when such a state is reformatted for potential report to another mind, or to oneself, recruiting theory of mind and narrative structure and placing its content in a space presumed to be shared. This proposal identifies a tractable bridge from nonconscious decision mechanisms to phenomenal consciousness, thereby placing part of the hard problem within empirical reach.

Indexed as

ConsciousnessDecision MakingNeurosciencesThinkingHumansintentionreporting-affordancetheory-of-mindweak phenomenology

Identifiers

PMID42189989
PMCPMC13229189

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.