Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42147364›Full record

ArticleApplied mathematics and optimization2026

From Nash Equilibrium to Social Optimum and Back: A Mean Field Perspective.

René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanıklı, François Delarue, Mathieu Laurière

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Article in Applied mathematics and optimization, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

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2 · The registry

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3 · Its place in the literature

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4 · The record

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

René CarmonaORFE, Bendheim Center for Finance, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA.
Gökçe DayanıklıDepartment of Statistics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820 USA.ORCID 0000-0002-4984-7574
François DelarueLaboratoire J.A. Dieudonné, Université Côte d'Azur, Parc Valrose, 06108 Nice, France.
Mathieu LaurièreShanghai Frontiers Science Center of Artificial Intelligence and Deep Learning, NYU-ECNU Institute of Mathematical Sciences, NYU Shanghai, Shanghai, 200126 People's Republic of China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Mean field games (MFGs) and mean field control (MFC) have been introduced to study large populations of strategic players. They correspond respectively to non-cooperative or cooperative scenarios, where the aim is to find the Nash equilibrium and social optimum. They approximate finite player problems and have many applications in economics, biology, machine learning. This paper studies how players can pass from a non-cooperative to a cooperative regime, and vice-versa. The first direction is reminiscent of mechanism design, in which the game's definition is modified so that non-cooperative players reach an outcome similar to a cooperative scenario. The second direction studies how initially cooperative players gradually deviate from social optimum to reach Nash equilibrium when they optimize their individual cost very much in the spirit of the free-rider phenomenon. To formalize these connections, we introduce and theoretically analyze two new classes of games which lie between MFG and MFC:

Indexed as

Mean field controlMean field gamesMechanism designNash equilibriumSocial optimum

Identifiers

PMID42147364
PMCPMC13172019

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.