ArticlePNAS nexus2026
Fixing carbon credits requires a new financing model.
Article in PNAS nexus, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
0 citing papers in PubMed.
No citing paper in PubMed yet.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Carbon-crediting mechanisms could play a critical role in achieving net zero, yet growing evidence shows that many offset projects lack environmental integrity. Achieving geological net zero requires balancing residual fossil fuel-based emissions with permanent carbon dioxide removal (CDR), making the scale-up of CDR essential. However, current discussions on improving carbon-crediting mechanisms have focused too narrowly on implementation challenges, such as refining standards or monitoring systems. We argue that scaling permanent carbon removal requires a new financing model to address market barriers. This financing model must reduce price volatility and raise credit prices to attract investment. We propose a tiered auction framework to build and scale markets for novel CDR technologies by (i) setting a permanent removal target, (ii) ensuring minimum quality standards, and (iii) running reverse auctions combined with first-of-a-kind finance.
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.