ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2026
Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence, and Cyber Defense on Sensor Networks.
Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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Abstract
Inherently, there exists a significant security hole in sensor networks. The majority of sensors are not high-end Internet of Things (IoT) devices with sufficient computing resources. Connected sensors (physical nodes in real networks) are allocated to logical nodes and managed remotely by a supervisor in a virtual network. Data acquired by sensors are then collected by a data center on which artificial intelligence operates. If an adversary spoofs a logical node (e.g., an account in a transport layer security (TLS) session) of a vulnerable sensor on the network, then it can manipulate data input to artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence cannot verify the integrity of the data input for learning. It is difficult to stop data poisoning with no countermeasures against session spoofing. To avoid session spoofing, physical and logical nodes must be linked seamlessly. One might think this can be achieved by utilizing Hardware Root-of-Trust (HRoT) based on a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). However, a PUF is based on an expensive System-on-a-Chip (SoC), which has been specifically designed for high-end devices, like expensive smartphones. Many sensors (low-end and middle-end IoT devices) can hardly be protected with existing PUFs. Since the number of IoT devices with a PUF is insufficient to cover the entirety of IoT devices, an attacker can find a vulnerable IoT device with no PUF to perform session spoofing. This is the problem of numbers. To resolve it, we propose Physical Cyber Authentication (PCA). A Blockchain account (a logical node in a TLS session) is anchored to an integrated circuit (IC) chip inside a sensor, allowing Blockchain to manage sensor networks, which provides necessary data to artificial intelligence, thus forming a Blockchain of sensors.
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