Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42082629›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2026

A framework for quantum-secure communications in cyber-physical control systems with experimental demonstration in nuclear a reactor.

Konstantinos Gkouliaras, Vasileios Theos, True Miller, Brian Jowers, George Kennedy, Andy Grant, Terry Cronin, Philip G Evans, Stylianos Chatzidakis

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Konstantinos GkouliarasSchool of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA.
Vasileios TheosSchool of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA.
True MillerSchool of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA.
Brian JowersSchool of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA.
George KennedyToshiba Europe Ltd, Cambridge, UK.
Andy GrantToshiba Europe Ltd, Cambridge, UK.
Terry CroninToshiba International Corporation, Houston, TX, USA.
Philip G EvansComputational Sciences and Engineering Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA.
Stylianos ChatzidakisSchool of Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA. schatzid@purdue.edu.

Funding

DOE Office of Nuclear Energy's Nuclear Energy University Program DE-NE00009174
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD), a cryptographic method grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational hardness, promises provably secure communications. Its integration into critical infrastructure offers a pathway to secure resilient operation of next-generation control systems, from power-intensive data centers to remotely operated microreactors located in energy-deprived remote communities. While QKD has been demonstrated in laboratory and network settings, its use in safety-critical control systems remains unexplored where requirements on latency, key availability, and operational stability pose unique challenges. Here, we introduce a QKD-secured data acquisition and control framework for embedding quantum cybersecurity directly into safety-critical cyber-physical systems and report the first end-to-end experimental demonstration in a nuclear reactor. The framework establishes the conditions necessary to achieve secure, low-latency, real-time operation in safety-critical environments. Using a phase-encoding decoy-state BB84 system deployed on Purdue's 10 kWth fully digital research reactor (PUR-1) we validate the model and achieve real-time encryption and decryption of 2,000 reactor signals. Experiments demonstrated a stable secret-key rate of 320 kbps with a quantum bit error rate of 3.8% at 54 km, and maximum optical-fiber distances of 82 km with One-Time Pad (OTP) encryption and 140 km with AES-256. We further evaluated compliance with latency and key availability conditions using three cryptographic schemes (OTP, AES-256, ASCON), finding that all variants supported real-time operation at typical data reporting rates. Our results establish a universal framework for quantum-cybersecurity in safety-critical systems, demonstrating that quantum communication technologies can enable secure, low-latency, real-time operation of nuclear reactors and other critical infrastructure.

Indexed as

Cyber-physical testbedIndustrial control systemNuclear reactorQuantum key distribution

Identifiers

PMID42082629
PMCPMC13328603

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.