Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42077282›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in psychology2026

Beyond replacement anxiety: a psychological framework for understanding AI in natural science research.

Xinyi Qi, Yuchen Gao, Peiqing Sun

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Xinyi QiDepartment of Basic Teaching, Chuzhou Polytechnic, Chuzhou, China.
Yuchen GaoSchool of Management, Chuzhou Polytechnic, Chuzhou, China.
Peiqing SunSchool of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) is moving from a peripheral aid to a structuring force in natural science research. Large language models, multimodal systems, autonomous laboratories, and agentic tools now assist with literature analysis, coding, image interpretation, experimental optimization, manuscript preparation, and elements of peer review. Public discussion has largely emphasized acceleration, automation, and discovery potential. Yet the psychological implications of this transition for researchers remain underdeveloped. This perspective argues that AI in natural science should be understood not only as a technical shift, but also as a reorganization of the psychological environment of scientific work. Drawing on recent work on autonomous experimentation, AI-assisted writing and review, technostress, AI workplace anxiety, attitudes toward AI at work, and human-AI delegation, we propose a four-part framework organized around labor visibility, identity stability, accountability under delegated cognition, and institutional climate. We treat this framework as a theoretically grounded and partly inferential lens whose expression is expected to vary across disciplines, tasks, career stages, and institutional settings. We further argue that responsible AI adoption in science should be judged not only by speed or scale, but also by whether research systems preserve human agency, interpretive responsibility, developmental learning, and sustainable scientific careers. A psychological perspective does not oppose scientific modernization; rather, it clarifies the human conditions under which AI-enabled science can remain rigorous, trustworthy, and professionally livable.

Indexed as

artificial intelligenceinstitutional climatepsychological adaptationresearcher identityscientific labor

Identifiers

PMID42077282
PMCPMC13128544

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.