ArticleBioethics2026
Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Limits of Beneficence.
Article in Bioethics, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Authors and funding
1 author.
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Abstract
Procreative enhancement involves someone making a choice about what genetic trait(s) another person will have. Such control over the body (and mind) of another person, even if done for the recipient's benefit, threatens to overstep the moral boundary between persons. The use of genetic interventions to "enhance" one's offspring without their consent may violate that person's future autonomy. Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu argue, however, that the value of autonomy supports at least one class of procreative enhancements: those aimed at enhancing a future person's autonomy by improving their cognitive functioning. I argue that Schaefer et al.'s case for enhancing autonomy rests on a mistaken view about how autonomy bears on our moral obligations. They collapse the value of autonomy into the value of beneficence, or the value of promoting a person's well-being. I will show that while so-called autonomy enhancements may promote a future person's well-being, they cannot make a person more autonomous. Attempts to enhance a future person's autonomy by way of genetic modification instead constitute a violation of that person's autonomy.
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