Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42058102›Full record

ArticleEvolutionary human sciences2026

Social norms and group-bounded indirect reciprocity.

Wakaba Tateishi, Hirotaka Imada

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Evolutionary human sciences, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Wakaba TateishiDepartment of Business Administration, Hokkaido Musashi Women's University, Sapporo, Japan.
Hirotaka ImadaDepartment of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3604-4155

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism proposed to explain the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical models demonstrated that the use of both first-order information (i.e., whether an evaluation target cooperated) and second-order information (i.e., the reputation of an interaction partner of the evaluation target) is critical for the evolution of cooperation. However, empirical findings on the use of second-order information have been mixed. Drawing upon the literature on group-bounded indirect reciprocity, we tested the hypothesis that individuals would be more sensitive to second-order information when evaluating in-group interactions, compared to when evaluating out-group interactions. We conducted a preregistered online experiment (

Indexed as

cooperationindirect reciprocityin-group favouritismintergroup cooperationreputation

Identifiers

PMID42058102
PMCPMC13122392

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.