Evidence map›Paper›PMID 42031802›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2026

Evolutionary game and simulation analysis of collaborative governance of sports public opinion.

Shixu Chen, Yang Cao

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Shixu Chen *School of Physical Education and Sport Science, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China.
Yang Cao *School of Physical Education and Sport Science, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China. 1109765575@qq.com.

Funding

This work was supported by fujian provincial social science fund project of China No.FJ2025B141
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Amid globalization and digitalization, sports disciplines embody national competitive strength and cultural symbolism, but in the new-media context they also confront the growing complexity and high sensitivity associated with sudden public-opinion crises. Drawing on evolutionary game theory, this study develops a four-actor strategic model, including sports governing authorities, the media, sports organizations, and athletes, to elucidate how opinion salience, adverse impacts, policy-based incentives and sanctions, and multi-actor coordination shape strategy selection and evolutionary trajectories, and to validate the model through simulations.The findings indicate that (1) rising opinion salience hastens actors’ convergence on proactive strategies, whereas persistent adverse impacts can lock governance into a low-level equilibrium—or even drive evolutionary backsliding; (2) appropriately designed incentive–sanction mechanisms implemented by sports governing authorities effectively regulate media and organizational behavior and enhance the efficiency of public-opinion governance; (3) sports organizations serve as intermediaries and supporters within the governance chain and constitute a significant stabilizing force.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryPublic OpinionSportsComputer SimulationHumansCoordination mechanismEvolutionary game theorySports public-opinionSports public-opinion governance system

Identifiers

PMID42031802
PMCPMC13280341

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.