Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41988577›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in public health2026

The dynamic interactions of policy instruments in China's community sports governance: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis.

Jiao Yuan, Yaxuan Liu, Xianglin Luo

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in public health, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Jiao YuanSchool of Physical Education, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China.
Yaxuan LiuSchool of Physical Education, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China.
Xianglin LuoSchool of Physical Education, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Community sports governance critically shapes public health by affecting physical activity and chronic disease prevention. In China, shifting toward collaborative governance involving local governments, communities, and sports organizations is vital for optimizing public health resources, yet the strategic dynamics among these stakeholders remain poorly understood. This study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze their interactions, incorporating three policy instruments: fiscal incentives (α), performance pressure (β), and digital empowerment (γ). Numerical simulations reveal that intermediate subsidy levels and relaxed performance metrics often induce persistent strategic oscillations, undermining service stability. Conversely, strong administrative oversight (low β) and, more effectively, robust digital empowerment (high γ) significantly stabilize cooperation. A "Technology-Driven" strategy emerges as the most efficient pathway to a stable, fully cooperative equilibrium, ensuring reliable sports service delivery. The study concludes that effective governance requires a shift from subsidy reliance to frameworks centered on digital enablement and intelligent accountability. By lowering coordination costs and aligning stakeholder incentives, such an approach can foster a sustainable collaborative ecosystem that promotes physical activity and improves population health outcomes.

Indexed as

Game TheoryLocal GovernmentSportsChinaCooperative BehaviorHumansPublic Healthcollaborative governancecommunity sportsdigital empowermentevolutionary game theorypublic health

Identifiers

PMID41988577
PMCPMC13076283

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.