Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41978008›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2026

Hardware Implementation-Based Lightweight Privacy- Preserving Authentication Scheme for Internet of Drones Using Physically Unclonable Function.

Razan Alsulieman, Eduardo Hernandez Escobar, Richard Swilley, Ahmed Sherif, Kasem Khalil, Mohamed Elsersy, Rabab Abdelfattah

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors.

Razan AlsuliemanSchool of Computing Sciences and Computer Engineering, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA.
Eduardo Hernandez EscobarSchool of Computing Sciences and Computer Engineering, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA.ORCID 0009-0002-1916-6572
Richard SwilleySchool of Computing Sciences and Computer Engineering, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA.
Ahmed SherifSchool of Computing Sciences and Computer Engineering, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-1651-7325
Kasem KhalilElectrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS 38677, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-9659-8566
Mohamed ElsersyComputer Information Systems Department, Higher Colleges of Technology, Al Ain 25026, United Arab Emirates.ORCID 0000-0001-6533-2514
Rabab AbdelfattahSchool of Computing Sciences and Computer Engineering, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The Internet of Drones (IoD) has emerged as a critical extension of the Internet of Things, enabling unmanned aerial vehicles to support diverse applications, including precision agriculture, logistics, disaster monitoring, and security surveillance. Despite its rapid growth, securing IoD communications remains a significant challenge due to the open wireless environment, high drone mobility, and strict computational and energy constraints. Existing authentication mechanisms either rely on computationally expensive cryptographic operations or remain validated only at the protocol or simulation level, leaving a critical gap in practical, hardware-validated solutions suitable for resource-constrained drone platforms. This gap motivates the need for a lightweight, privacy-preserving authentication scheme that is both theoretically sound and experimentally deployable on real hardware. To address this, we propose a Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF)-assisted lightweight authentication scheme for IoD environments that binds cryptographic keys to each drone's intrinsic hardware characteristics via PUFs. The scheme employs dynamically generated pseudo-identities to conceal permanent drone identities and prevent tracking, while authentication and key agreement are achieved using efficient symmetric cryptographic primitives, including SHA-256 for key derivation and updates, AES-256 for secure communication, and lightweight XOR operations to minimize overhead. Forward secrecy is ensured through rolling key updates, and periodic renewal of PUF challenges enhances resistance to replay and modeling attacks. To validate practicality, both software-based and hardware-based implementations were developed and evaluated. The software evaluation demonstrates a low communication overhead of 708.5 bytes and an average computation time of 18.87 ms. The hardware implementation on a Nexys A7-100T FPGA operates at 100 MHz with only 12.49% LUT utilization and low dynamic power consumption of approximately 182.5 mW. These results confirm that the proposed framework achieves an effective balance between security, privacy, and efficiency. The significance of this work lies in providing a fully hardware-validated, PUF-based authentication framework specifically tailored to the real-world constraints of IoD environments, offering a practical foundation for securing next-generation drone networks.

Indexed as

authenticationhardware accelerationInternet of Dronesphysical unclonable function

Identifiers

PMID41978008
PMCPMC13075310

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LicenceCC BY
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.