ArticleScientific reports2026
Evolutionary path from a prisoner's dilemma to a harmony game via hawk-dove games.
Article in Scientific reports, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
0 citing papers in PubMed.
No citing paper in PubMed yet.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
In most evolutionary matrix game models, the payoffs are assumed to be constant. Here, we develop a toy model of hunting in pairs in which interaction outcomes are determined not only by the behavioural strategy choice of the players but also a second, evolvable physical trait of them. We analyse the evolutionary dynamics of this model in a limiting case of the classical monomorphic framework introduced by Maynard Smith and Price characterised by rare mutations in physical trait, moderately frequent mutations in behaviour, and very fast selection in both. We show that this process can transform the evolutionarily stable strategy and, as a result, even the nature of the game played in the population: We present an illustrative numerical example in which the concurrent evolution of the behavioural and trait components of the phenotype turns a social dilemma into a harmony game via an intermediate phase of coexistence.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.