Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41965625›Full record

ArticleBMC medical informatics and decision making2026

Proposal of a procedure to stratify the reidentification risk of medical data: RIMEDA.

Sebastian Behre, Dorothea Kesztyüs, Sarah Schnabel, Tibor Kesztyüs

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC medical informatics and decision making, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Sebastian Behre *Department of Medical Informatics, University Medical Center, Georg- August-University, Von-Siebold-Straße 3, 37075, Göttingen, Germany.
Dorothea Kesztyüs *Department of Medical Informatics, University Medical Center, Georg- August-University, Von-Siebold-Straße 3, 37075, Göttingen, Germany. dorothea.kesztyues@med.uni-goettingen.de.
Sarah SchnabelDepartment of Medical Informatics, University Medical Center, Georg- August-University, Von-Siebold-Straße 3, 37075, Göttingen, Germany.
Tibor KesztyüsDepartment of Medical Informatics, University Medical Center, Georg- August-University, Von-Siebold-Straße 3, 37075, Göttingen, Germany.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundRoutine medical data are highly valuable for secondary use, and data sharing is a prerequisite for pioneering research. Furthermore, since the advent of artificial intelligence and its application in various medical fields, such as decision-making and pharmacovigilance, the demand for real-world training data has steadily increased. However, the associated privacy risk, especially concerning reidentification, is extremely sensitive, and we are currently unaware of any standardised method to quantify it comprehensively.

methodsAssessing the reidentification risk of a data collection under examination requires the consideration and analysis of a complex system. To develop a holistic framework for stratifying this risk, an integrative approach is followed where the risk of deanonymisation is not considered mono-causally but includes various aspects. On the basis of a systematic literature review, factors and corresponding risks that are decisive in reidentification attacks are identified. These factors are grouped into overarching perspectives, and evaluation criteria are developed, facilitating the systematic grading of each risk factor by a data controller. Interactions between factors are visualised in entity‒relationship models (ERMs), and their direction and supposed magnitude are quantified in an influence matrix. Finally, on the basis of this matrix, a risk score and different indices are generated to evaluate the reidentification risk and facilitate possible countermeasures.

resultsThe reidentification risk comprises four general perspectives regarding data, knowledge, potential attackers, and technical/organisational aspects. The ERMs represent a complex system of clear interconnections between the factors of the respective perspectives. The final calculation is performed in the influence matrix based on the assessment of the data controller. The derivable indices and visualisations provide indications of particularly risk-driving components of a dataset and thus for targeted safety measures, such as generalisation, suppression and randomisation approaches. Experiments to determine the functionality of the method via published and verified reidentification attacks confirm the plausibility and selectivity of risk stratification.

conclusionA quantitative assessment of the reidentification risk of a medical dataset, including the identification of risk drivers, is necessary and feasible. The proposed prototype must be further evaluated and will serve as the basis for the development of a software application.

Indexed as

Computer SecurityConfidentialityData AnonymizationHumansRisk AssessmentAnonymisationData securityData sharing, privacyPseudonymisationReidentificationRisk stratificationRoutine medical data

Identifiers

PMID41965625
PMCPMC13072523

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.