ArticleHealth economics2026
Pharmaceutical Pricing and R&D as a Global Public Good.
Article in Health economics, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
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Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed.
- Bridging the divide between health economics and outcomes research and biomedical investment: reflections from a health economist working in venture capital.Journal of comparative effectiveness research · 2026Review
- Pharmaceutical Pricing and R&D as a Global Public Good.Health economics · 2026Article
- Timely, Cheap, or Risk-Free? The Effect of Regulation on the Price and Availability of New Drugs.Pharmacy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
This paper examines the international variation in the prices of branded pharmaceuticals. We consider short-run profits, or quasi-rents, as representing each country's contribution toward the global public good of therapeutic information embodied in new pharmaceuticals. We characterize globally optimal contributions through the Samuelson-Lindahl criteria and contrast the resulting outcomes with the Nash noncooperative equilibrium as developed in the Olson-Zeckhauser theory of international alliances. That theory predicts both the undersupply of public goods and the "exploitation" of large countries by small ones. We calculate national contributions to the global public good with data from a recent RAND report. Other countries' contributions resulting from their prices are much lower than those in the United States, but their free riding is not complete. We also find that country size is a powerful determinant of contributions and that larger countries contribute disproportionately more. Finally, we suggest a cooperative policy approach that would move us closer to optimality with health benefits for all countries.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.