ArticleFrontiers in public health2026
A robust and verifiable federated learning framework for preventing data poisonous threats in e-health.
Article in Frontiers in public health, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
0 citing papers in PubMed.
No citing paper in PubMed yet.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Introduction: Federated Learning (FL) has become an attractive approach for e-health because it allows multiple institutions to collaboratively train machine learning models without directly sharing sensitive patient data. Despite these advantages, FL systems are still susceptible to poisoning attacks in which malicious participants manipulate model updates to degrade performance or embed hidden backdoors. Such threats raise serious concerns for medical applications, where reliability, transparency, and regulatory compliance are essential. Methods: In this work, we introduce FedSecure-Chain, a modular framework designed to improve the reliability of federated learning environments. The proposed approach combines three phases: an anomaly detection stage applied before aggregation to identify suspicious client updates, a robust aggregation strategy to limit the influence of potentially malicious contributions, and a lightweight blockchain layer that records model updates and client trust information to ensure traceability and auditing. The framework was evaluated on Breast Cancer datasets using TabNet and compact multilayer perceptron (MLP) models under several poisoning attack scenarios and different non-IID data distributions. Results: The experimental evaluation indicates that integrating anomaly detection with robust aggregation significantly reduces the impact of poisoning attacks on the global model. In addition, the blockchain logging layer enables transparent tracking of model updates while introducing only limited overhead. Overall, the proposed framework maintains stable model performance even in the presence of adversarial participants. Discussion: The results suggest that combining defensive learning strategies with transparent logging mechanisms can strengthen trust in federated healthcare systems. By improving resilience to adversarial manipulation while keeping computational and operational costs manageable, Our method represents a practical step toward secure and trustworthy federated learning for healthcare applications.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.