Why is "remember" recognition faster than "know" recognition when recollection is supposed to be slower than familiarity-based recognition? A suggested explanation.

The dual-process theories of recognition memory postulate that recollection is slower and effortful whereas familiarity-based recognition is fast, automatic, and effortless. Although data from response-signal experiments are consistent with this dual-process position, results from experiments using the remember/know judgment paradigm are diametrically opposed to the dual-process theoretical view. That is, "remember"-based recognition has consistently been found to be faster than "know"-based recognition in the literature. Yet remember judgment is supposed to be based on recollection and know judgment based on familiarity. The present study proposed an explanation for this puzzle, which assumes that each approach bases its observation on one aspect of recognition-that is, either the contents or the strength of memory, with the dual-process approach addressing contents retrieved, and remember/know judgment the strength of memory, respectively. The conclusion is that retrieving more contents does take longer than retrieving fewer contents as posited by the dual-process theories, but that the old/new decision is faster for the stronger case with more retrieved contents (as assessed by the "remember" judgment) than for the weaker case with fewer retrieved contents (as assessed by the "know" judgment).