Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41774058›Full record

ArticleAnnals of the New York Academy of Sciences2026

Anchored and Propagated Updating Within Pseudoscientific Belief Systems.

Josue García-Arch, Marc Ballestero-Arnau, Itxaso Barbería, Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Josue García-ArchDepartament De Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia De l'Educació, Secció Processos Cognitius, Institut de Neurociències (UBneuro), Universitat De Barcelona (UB), Barcelona, Spain.
Marc Ballestero-ArnauDepartament De Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia De l'Educació, Secció Processos Cognitius, Institut de Neurociències (UBneuro), Universitat De Barcelona (UB), Barcelona, Spain.
Itxaso BarberíaGrup De Recerca en Cognició i Llenguatge (GRECIL), Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia De l'Educació, Secció Processos Cognitius, Institut de Neurociències (UBneuro), Universitat De Barcelona (UB), Barcelona, Spain.
Javier Rodríguez-FerreiroGrup De Recerca en Cognició i Llenguatge (GRECIL), Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia De l'Educació, Secció Processos Cognitius, Institut de Neurociències (UBneuro), Universitat De Barcelona (UB), Barcelona, Spain.

Funding

AGAUREuropean Regional Development FundMinisterio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Pseudoscientific beliefs exert a profound influence on health behaviors, political decisions, and public trust in science, yet research has primarily identified correlates of pseudoscience acceptance rather than the mechanisms by which such beliefs form and update. In this study, we leveraged computational modeling to investigate how normative social feedback shapes pseudoscientific belief revision. A total of 300 US nationally representative participants conducted a learning task where they rated a set of 20 validated pseudoscientific statements while receiving trial-by-trial feedback. Behaviorally, participants showed systematic reductions in prediction errors across trials, consistent with iterative belief updating. Computational model comparison using hierarchical Bayesian inference revealed that learning was best captured by an anchored propagation model, in which prediction errors spread across correlated beliefs but were stabilized by an anchoring parameter reflecting initial convictions. Exploratory analyses further showed that belief updating depended on the alignment between prior expectations and normative feedback, amplifying congruent information and dampening incongruent inputs. These findings provide the first mechanistic account of how pseudoscientific beliefs are simultaneously receptive to new information and resistant to change, offering an integrative framework with implications for research in belief updating, social cognition, and interventions to reduce misinformation.

Indexed as

CultureBayes TheoremFemaleHumansLearningMaleOutcome ExpectationsTrustbelief updatingmisinformationpseudosciencesocial learningunwarranted beliefs

Identifiers

PMID41774058
PMCPMC12955757

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.