Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41704937›Full record

ReviewNeuroscience of consciousness2026

Beyond computational equivalence: the behavioral inference principle for machine consciousness.

Stefano Palminteri, Charley M Wu

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Neuroscience of consciousness, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Stefano PalminteriDépartement d'Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL, Research University, 29 rue d'Ulm, 75005, Paris, France.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5768-6646
Charley M WuCentre for Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology, Technical University of Darmstadt, Alexanderstraße 10, 64283 Darmstadt, Germany.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become a central topic in AI and cognitive science, due to their unprecedented performance in a vast array of tasks. Indeed, some even see "sparks of artificial general intelligence" in their apparently boundless faculty for conversation and reasoning. Their sophisticated emergent faculties, which were not initially anticipated by their designers, have ignited an urgent debate about whether and under which circumstances we should attribute consciousness to artificial entities in general and LLMs in particular. The current consensus, rooted in computational functionalism, proposes that consciousness should be ascribed based on a principle of computational equivalence. The objective of this opinion piece is to criticize this current approach and argue in favor of an alternative "

Indexed as

artificial intelligencecomputational modelingconsciousnessmethodologyphilosophytheories and models

Identifiers

PMID41704937
PMCPMC12907924

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.