Dynamical Cognitive Science! Wherefore Art Thou?

This topic revisits and elucidates the impact of dynamical systems theory (DST) since the "dynamical hypothesis" was presented in the 1990s as an alternative to the information-processing approaches central to orthodox cognitive science. The dynamical hypothesis does not investigate cognition as necessitating explanations in computational or representational terms. Instead, DST is leveraged to approach cognition in temporal terms (e.g., continuous, self-organizing) that often encompass brain-body-environment systems. The contributions collected here examine DST's experimental, methodological, and theoretical roles across such areas as informatics, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology. They explore how DST reshapes debates about computation, representation, and embodiment, extending from individual cognition to artificial and social systems. Papers address advances in fractality, multiscale modeling, and nonlinear methods; applications to behavioral and neural coordination; and theoretical syntheses linking dynamics with cultural and symbolic processes. Together, they assess DST's growing influence in a "dynamical renaissance" within the cognitive and brain sciences, highlighting both its promise as a unifying framework and its conceptual challenges. Thus, this provides a comprehensive and critical overview of how the dynamical hypothesis continues to expand, guide, and refine the understanding of cognition as an emergent, temporally extended, and interactive process across biological, social, and artificial domains.