ArticlePhenomenology and the cognitive sciences2026
Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory.
Article in Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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Abstract
One way to theorize about we-identities-the identities that individual subjects have as 'one of us'-is in terms of the uniformity, interchangeability, and prototypicality of group members. The social-psychological theory of self-categorization epitomizes this approach, which has strongly influenced contemporary phenomenological research on the we. This paper argues that this approach has one important and largely overlooked limitation: the we-identities tied to close personal relationships-exemplified by long-term friendships and romantic partnerships-are based on patterns of interpersonal interaction and integration through which individuals tend to grasp their non-substitutability and complementarity. This limitation suggests that another approach is needed to tackle the we-identities characteristic of close personal relationships. I outline such an approach, by combining resources from classical phenomenology and ongoing research on the socially extended mind.
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