Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41642828›Full record

ArticlePloS one2026

Prior beliefs & automated fact checking: Limits on the effectiveness of AI-based corrections.

Kelly M Amaddio, Jacob T Goebel, Jason K Clark, Duane T Wegener, R Kelly Garrett, Mark W Susmann, Srinivasan Parthasarathy

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors.

Kelly M AmaddioDepartment of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America.ORCID https://orcid.org/0009-0005-5583-885X
Jacob T GoebelDepartment of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America.
Jason K ClarkDepartment of Psychology and Philosophy, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas, United States of America.
Duane T WegenerDepartment of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7639-4251
R Kelly GarrettSchool of Communications, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7022-7452
Mark W SusmannDepartment of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, United States of America.
Srinivasan ParthasarathyDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, United States of America.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Proliferation of misinformation poses significant challenges in contemporary society, necessitating efficient strategies for its identification and mitigation. Automated fact-checking systems might prove effective, but they face challenges, particularly in charged contexts where prior beliefs are likely to influence responses to fact-checks. Data from two studies where participants were given a piece of gun-control misinformation and an automated fact-checker correction (N = 1,372) illustrate the nuanced interplay between prior beliefs, trust in artificial intelligence (AI), and the perceived accuracy of fact-checking systems in shaping (a) post-correction misinformation endorsement, and (b) post-correction perceptions of system quality. Study 1 examined default perceptions of system accuracy and demonstrated a high degree of variability in those perceptions; when fact-checked by such a system, people's prior beliefs predicted continued belief after the correction and post-correction perceptions of the fact-check system. Study 2 directly manipulated the purported accuracy of the system. When automated fact-checkers were said to have an accuracy level close to current expectations of existing AI systems (67%), people continued to believe misinformation more to the extent it was consistent with prior beliefs. This pattern was attenuated when participants were told that the fact-checker was highly (97%) accurate. Similarly, prior beliefs related more strongly to post-correction perceptions of system reliability when accuracy information was provided and especially when the system was described as not highly accurate. This research demonstrates biases in reactions to automated fact-checkers and highlights the importance of accounting for individual beliefs and perceived system characteristics in designing scalable interventions.

Indexed as

Artificial IntelligenceCommunicationAdultFemaleHumansMaleTrustYoung Adult

Identifiers

PMID41642828
PMCPMC12875456

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.