Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41634217›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2026

Research on infrastructure network protection strategy based on bayesian stackelberg game under asymmetric conditions.

Jiarui Zhang, Yinjun Gao, Weijie Kang, Wenli Tian, Yueer Li

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Jiarui ZhangNorthwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, Xi'an, 710024, China. zjr888@stu.xjtu.edu.cn.
Yinjun GaoNorthwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, Xi'an, 710024, China.
Weijie KangRocket University of Engineering, Xi'an, 710025, China.
Wenli TianNorthwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, Xi'an, 710024, China.
Yueer LiInstitute of Global Environmental Change, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an, 710049, China.

Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China 72501224
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

As security threats emerge, how to protect the highly-dependent infrastructure of modern society has become a great challenge. Previous studies have mostly assumed that attackers are completely rational and well-informed, and have generally considered only a single type of attacker. However, these assumptions are inconsistent with reality, where attackers often have incomplete information and irrational behavior. This paper combines network science and game theory, based on the Bayesian Stackelberg game model, studies the defense strategy under the condition of incomplete information. We especially consider the variation of rationality degree of multi-type attackers, and propose a camouflage network construction model and a strong ɛ equilibrium strategy. In addition, the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified by experiments. Preventive and protective measures can be taken before an attacker can launch an attack, thus greatly reducing the risk of an attack on an infrastructure network.

Indexed as

Cascading failureComplex networkEquilibriumInfrastructure protectionStackelberg game

Identifiers

PMID41634217
PMCPMC12921223

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.