Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41593958›Full record

ArticleEntropy (Basel, Switzerland)2025

Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria.

Remigiusz Smoliński, Piotr Frąckiewicz, Krzysztof Grzanka, Marek Szopa

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Entropy (Basel, Switzerland), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Remigiusz SmolińskiCenter for International Negotiation, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management in Leipzig, 04109 Leipzig, Germany.ORCID 0000-0003-1739-8687
Piotr FrąckiewiczInstitute of Exact and Technical Sciences, Pomeranian University in Słupsk, 76-200 Słupsk, Poland.ORCID 0000-0003-0034-9803
Krzysztof GrzankaDepartment of Operations Research, University of Economics in Katowice, 40-287 Katowice, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-7228-4768
Marek SzopaDepartment of Operations Research, University of Economics in Katowice, 40-287 Katowice, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-7897-7004

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper applies quantum game theory to three ethical dilemmas that frequently arise in negotiation: cooperation versus competition, self-interest versus equity, and honesty versus deception. Using quantum extensions of selected games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Ultimatum Game, the Battle of the Sexes, and the Buyer-Seller Game, we examine whether quantization can generate equilibria that improve classical outcomes while also aligning more closely with ethical principles such as fairness, cooperation, and honesty. The analysis shows that quantum strategies, through entanglement and superposition, can sustain cooperative, fair, or honest behaviour as stable equilibria, outcomes that are typically unstable or unattainable in classical settings. The specific outcomes depend on the chosen quantization method, but across cases, the analysis consistently shows that quantum formulations expand the range of solutions in which efficiency and ethical principles co-exist.

Indexed as

competitioncooperationequityethicsfairnesshonestynash equilibriumnegotiation gamesquantum game theoryself-interest

Identifiers

PMID41593958
PMCPMC12839691

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.