Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41499424›Full record

ArticlePloS one2026

Inequality aversion and prosocial punishment: Evidence from a one-shot public goods game.

Per F Andersson, Martina Testori, Sergio Lo Iacono

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Per F AnderssonDepartment of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0507-6931
Martina TestoriDepartment of Sociology, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7292-7129
Sergio Lo IaconoGreenwich Business School, University of Greenwich, London, United Kingdom.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7316-5162

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The willingness to engage in costly punishment of free riders (prosocial punishment) is crucial to foster group cooperation and understand public goods provision. While prosocial punishment is common across societies, its motivations remain unclear. Scholars have suggested that people resist inequitable outcomes and willingly bear costs to sanction free riders, seeking a fairer distribution of payoffs. This study tests a key implication of such fairness-driven arguments: if inequality aversion drives prosocial punishment, individuals should punish less when redistribution occurs, as equality concerns would be already satisfied. We conducted a pre-registered 2x2 between-subjects lab experiment (N=320), where participants completed a Social Value Orientation (SVO) task and played a one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG) with a Punishment Stage. We manipulated endowment inequality and the presence of redistributive taxation. Pre-registered analyses show that (1) inequality aversion does not predict prosocial punishment; (2) punishment levels do not significantly differ across treatments. However, exploratory results suggest that under high inequality, redistribution reduces the intensity of punishment towards richer individuals. This could indicate that inequality aversion triggers prosocial punishment only at acute inequality levels.

Indexed as

PunishmentSocial BehaviorAdultCooperative BehaviorFemaleGames, ExperimentalGame TheoryHumansMaleSocial ValuesSocioeconomic FactorsYoung Adult

Identifiers

PMID41499424
PMCPMC12779032

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.