Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41426655›Full record

ArticleSN computer science2026

To Signal or Not to Signal? A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach to Discretionary Communication Between Road Users.

Isam Bitar, Albert Solernou Crusat, Richard Romano, David Watling

Abstract read
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in SN computer science, 2026. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Isam BitarInstitute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, 34-40 University Rd, Leeds, LS2 9JT UK.ORCID 0000-0002-5130-0148
Albert Solernou CrusatInstitute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, 34-40 University Rd, Leeds, LS2 9JT UK.ORCID 0000-0003-4857-0240
Richard RomanoInstitute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, 34-40 University Rd, Leeds, LS2 9JT UK.ORCID 0000-0002-2132-4077
David WatlingInstitute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, 34-40 University Rd, Leeds, LS2 9JT UK.ORCID 0000-0002-6193-9121

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Reciprocal communication between road users is a vital element of road user interaction. Non-cooperative game theory is an effective framework for modelling and characterising communicative behaviour between road users, which enables the study of emergent benefits for both the issuer and recipient of communicative signals. In this paper, we introduce discretionary communication to gain an advantage over the other road user by masking one's intent if beneficial to do so. We conduct a series of experiments with simulated interactions and compare interaction outcomes where communication is mandatory against those where communication is discretionary. Our findings further support the premise that non-cooperative game theory is an effective paradigm for modelling and producing emergent behaviours which benefit the network. Moreover, we see that including a layer of

Indexed as

Bayesian gamesCheap talkCommunicationDiscretionary communicationEmergent cooperationFirst mover advantageGame theoryNon-cooperative games

Identifiers

PMID41426655
PMCPMC12711921

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.