ArticleEngineering biology
Creating Enforceable Biosecurity Standards for Nucleic Acid Providers.
Article in Engineering biology. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
8 citing papers in PubMed.
- Red-teaming as an imperative for strengthening synthetic nucleic acid screening.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Review
- Strengthening global biosecurity for synthetic nucleic acid technology: from sequence screening to risk-based governance in the AI era.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Review
- Implementing emerging customer screening standards for nucleic acid synthesis.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- The evolution of the United States nucleic acid screening policies.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Review
- Securing the U.S. nucleic acid synthesis industry: a case for safe-harbor information sharing.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Beyond sequence similarity: toward function-based screening of nucleic acid synthesis.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Developing a standard definition for sequences of concern.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Creating Enforceable Biosecurity Standards for Nucleic Acid Providers.Engineering biologyArticle
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Although there is broad agreement among biosecurity experts that nucleic acid synthesis providers should screen orders for potential threats, there is no agreed upon mechanism to verify whether a provider is implementing effective screening practices. This leads to economic costs for responsible actors, unverifiable claims of screening, and regulatory hesitation. The sequence biosecurity risk consortium (SBRC) aims to address these problems by developing a standard definition of 'sequences of concern' based on a scientific assessment of biosecurity risk from synthetic nucleic acids. Building on this effort, we outline a roadmap for moving from aspirational to enforceable standards via industry-led standards development, with support and participation from government regulators.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.