Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41415006›Full record

ArticlePhilosophy of medicine (Pittsburgh, Pa.)2025

Agential Epistemic Injustice in Clinical Interactions Is Bad for Medicine.

Lisa Bortolotti

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Philosophy of medicine (Pittsburgh, Pa.), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Lisa BortolottiDepartment of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom; Department of Neurosciences and Rehabilitation, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy.

Funding

Medical Research Council MR/T04618X/1Wellcome Trust 226603
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In interactions characterized by agential epistemic injustice, the interpreter avoids engaging with the speaker's perspective and challenges or distorts the speaker's contribution before taking time to explore it. Where the success of the interaction depends on a genuine knowledge exchange between interpreters and speakers, epistemic injustice compromises the success of the interaction. Building on recent qualitative work on communication in youth mental health, I argue that clinical interactions are less likely to achieve their aims when practitioners fail to engage with the perspective of the person seeking support, and challenge or distort the person's contribution before taking time to explore it.

Identifiers

PMID41415006
PMCPMC7618486

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.