Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41397136›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2025

Promoters of cooperation in evolutionary games.

Jakub Svoboda, Krishnendu Chatterjee

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Jakub SvobodaInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, Klosterneuburg 3400, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-1419-3267
Krishnendu ChatterjeeInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, Klosterneuburg 3400, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-4561-241X

Funding

Austrian Science Fund (FWF) 10.55776/COE12EC | ERC | HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council (ERC) CoG 863818
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Evolutionary games provide a flexible mathematical framework for many problems in biology and social evolution. Prisoners' dilemma, and in particular, the important special case of donation games, represents social dilemmas where cooperation is mutually beneficial, yet defection is preferred by selfish agents. In evolutionary games on networks, the agents interact over a population structure. The existence of population structures that promote cooperative behavior is a fascinating and active research topic. Previous research establishes structures promoting cooperation in the limit of weak selection where the benefit-to-cost ratio

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionCooperative BehaviorGame TheorySocial EvolutionComputer SimulationHumansPrisoner Dilemmacooperationevolutionary dynamicsgame theoryprisoners’ dilemma

Identifiers

PMID41397136
PMCPMC12745783

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.