Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41377589›Full record

ArticleEconomic journal (London, England)2025

Healthcare Appointments as Commitment Devices.

Laura Derksen, Jason T Kerwin, Natalia Ordaz Reynoso, Olivier Sterck

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Economic journal (London, England), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Laura DerksenDepartment of Management, University of Toronto.
Jason T KerwinDepartment of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, and J-PAL.
Natalia Ordaz ReynosoAXA Research Lab on Gender Equality, Dondena Research Centre, Bocconi University.
Olivier SterckDepartment of International Development, University of Oxford.

Funding

Scientific/Technical CoreP2CHD042828 · NICHD · UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON · PI SARA R. CURRAN · 2017 to 2026
$6.3M
Minnesota Population Center Science and Technical CoreP2CHD041023 · NICHD · UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA · PI THERESA LOUISE OSYPUK · 2016 to 2026
$4.3M
NICHD NIH HHS P2C HD041023NICHD NIH HHS P2C HD042828
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.

Indexed as

AppointmentsCommitment DevicesD81HealthHIVI15O12Self-Control

Identifiers

PMID41377589
PMCPMC12687577

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.