ArticleScientific reports2025
Game theoretic modeling and optimization of competition and collaboration in dual channel electronic waste supply chains.
Article in Scientific reports, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Sustainable closed-loop supply chain management for a two-warehouse system with trade-credit and emissions constraints under dynamic demand.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- Sustainable-resilient and climate-responsive e-waste supply chain network design under uncertainty using four-valued refined neutrosophic optimization.Scientific reports · 2026Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
Abstract
The rapid growth of electronic waste (e-waste) presents critical challenges for sustainable resource recovery and environmental protection. This study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, that integrates dynamic pricing and cost-sharing mechanisms to optimize both economic and environmental outcomes. The model explicitly captures strategic interactions between manufacturer-led and third-party recycling channels, accounting for consumer behavior, regulatory incentives, and market competition. Numerical simulations conducted (implemented over a four-iteration horizon using a commercial optimization solver) show that, relative to the baseline equilibrium, manufacturer profit increases from 11.6 thousand USD to 37.9 thousand USD (+226.8%), total recycled volume rises from 7,848 to 7,942 units (+1.2%), and collector profit nearly doubles under cost-sharing, enabling more equitable profit distribution. Furthermore, scenario-based simulations across Sub-Saharan Africa, high-income economies, and emerging Asian industrial countries reveal that infrastructure quality, policy intensity, and labor costs critically shape recycling efficiency and profit allocation. These findings demonstrate that subsidies alone are insufficient to ensure system efficiency. Instead, coordinated strategies that integrate internal incentive alignment with context-sensitive policy support are required. Overall, this study offers a robust framework for designing resilient, efficient, and regionally adaptable e-waste management systems.
Identifiers
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.