Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41306550›Full record

ArticlePNAS nexus2025

Social networks affect redistribution decisions and polarization.

Milena Tsvetkova, Henrik Olsson, Mirta Galesic

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PNAS nexus, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Milena TsvetkovaDepartment of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3552-108X
Henrik OlssonSanta Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0099-7862
Mirta GalesicSanta Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1712-9455

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We investigate theoretically and empirically how network structure affects collective decisions about redistribution in an unequal society. We study the effects of assortativity by wealth (observing others with similar or different wealth) and visibility by wealth (observing rich or poor others) on voting for redistribution and the polarization of votes, as well as satisfaction and perceptions of fairness. We develop a computational model and test the predictions of the model in an online network experiment. The results reveal that although most social networks lead people to under-observe inequality, different structural properties produce different collective outcomes: redistribution and polarization are the lowest in networks with maximum assortativity, where participants are segregated by wealth, and the highest in networks where the rich are most visible. Furthermore, segregation keeps the poor poorest but satisfied, while observing the rich makes them dissatisfied despite becoming better off. These findings suggest that political communication and policy strategies aiming to increase support for redistribution should enhance the visibility of excessive wealth. At the same time, it is crucial to ensure that this does not exacerbate polarization and conflict.

Indexed as

inequalitynetwork effectspolarizationredistributionvoting

Identifiers

PMID41306550
PMCPMC12645457

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.